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Ethics Rulings and Opinions Presented
to the Board of Governors 11/16/00 NEW HAMPSHIRE BAR ASSOCIATION Ethics
Committee Advisory Opinion # 2000-01/05 RELEASE OF BILLING STATEMENT TO THIRD PARTY AUDITORS Rule
References: *
Rule 1.4(b) *
Rule 1.6 *
Rule 1.7 *
Rule 1.8(f)(3) Subjects: *
The tripartite relationship between insured, insurance
defense counsel, and insurance company. *
Review of confidential billing statements by outside
auditors. *
Informed consent for release of client confidences. *
Attorney/client privilege/waiver. *
Work product doctrine/waiver. Annotations: A
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of
a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized to carry out the
representation. (Rules
1.6(a); 1.6(b)). An
insurance defense lawyer may not disclose billing statements to
third party auditors employed by the insurance company unless the
client consents after consultation.
(Rule 1.6(a)). The
“implied authorization” exception to Rule 1.6(a) must be
narrowly construed. (Rule
1.6(b)). The
“implied authorization” exception to Rule 1.6 does not extend
to, or allow, disclosure of confidential information protected by
the Rule to third party auditors. An
attorney may not ethically comply with a request or requirement to
seek the consent of the client/insured to disclose billing
statements to a third party auditor.
(Rules 1.7 and 1.8). Within
the tripartite relationship of insurer, insurance defense counsel,
and insured, defense counsel’s paramount duty extends to the
insured.
I.
QUESTION Can
an attorney retained by an insurance company (“carrier”) to
defend its insured ethically disclose detailed billing statements
to an outside auditor for review on behalf of the carrier?[1]
II.
FACTUAL SETTING The
use of outside audit agencies to review the bills of insurance
defense counsel has become an increasingly common, cost-cutting
practice within the insurance industry.[2]
These companies review bills to ensure compliance with
detailed billing guidelines of the carrier; and to identify
perceived inefficiencies and billing errors. The
methodologies of audit companies will vary.
See e.g. Baker, “You Charged How Much?” ABA
Journal (Feb., 1999); Bradley, Charlton & Knowles, “The
Debate Surrounding Third Party Analysis of Bills,” Spring, 1999
ABA National Legal Malpractice Conference Materials.
However, employees of audit companies – unlike claims
adjusters or claims counsel – generally have no familiarity with
the cases that generate the bills.
Rather, they perform the audit function and check for
billing guideline compliance based on detailed billing statements
required by the carrier. These billing statements regularly disclose the substance of communications between insurance defense counsel and client (the insured); ongoing trial preparation; witness identity; investigative activities, etc. Some audit companies also require submission of file materials before authorizing payment of related fees. When the initial audit of a bill results in exceptions to entries on the statement, defense counsel will frequently be asked to provide further information about the case to justify the time devoted to the task. In short, the billing information and file materials required by audit companies inevitably contain confidential information protected by Rule 1.6 of the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct and/or by the common law attorney client privilege and work product doctrine.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Background: The Tripartite Relationship Between Insurance
Defense Counsel, Insurer and Insured: While
the New Hampshire Supreme Court has not undertaken an exhaustive
examination of the tripartite relationship, the Court has held--in
resolving a dispute regarding discovery of the insurance company
file in a negligent failure to settle case--that the company’s
claim of privilege against its insured was without merit since it
“fails to take into account that the attorney (the insurance
company) engaged represented both the (insurance company) and the
present plaintiff Dumas (the insured).”
Dumas v. State Farm Automobile Insurance, 111 N.H.
43, 49 (1971). The Court reasoned that: (W)here
two parties are represented by the same attorneys for their mutual
benefit, the communications between the parties are not privileged
in later action between such parties or their representatives.
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. (Citations
omitted.) The
Court’s rationale is consistent with the traditional view that
the tripartite relationship between insurer, insurance defense
counsel and insured involves dual representation of
“co-clients.”[3] Under
the dual client doctrine, “so long as the interests of the
insurer and the insured coincide, they are both the clients of the
defense attorney and the defense attorney’s fiduciary duty runs
to both the insurer and the insured.”
National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Stites Professional
Law Association, 1 Cal Rptr. 2d. 570, 575 (Cal. App. 1991). See
also Mallen, “Looking to the Millennium: Will the
Tripartite Relationship Survive?”,
Defense Counsel Journal, October 1999 at 481-82
(tripartite relationship has traditionally been seen as one
composed of dual attorney-client relationships with both the
insured and the insurance company.) Alternatively, courts have
ruled that only the insured is the client, while the insurer is a
third party payor. See, e.g. Atlanta
International Insurance Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W. 2d. 294 (Mich.
1991). See also
Gibbs v. Lappies. The
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, now
published in final form after several drafts, chose neither the
dual representation nor the third party payor model. While
emphasizing the paramount duties of insurance defense counsel to
the insured, the Restatement leaves the nature of the tripartite
relationship to the facts of the given case: It
is clear in an insurance situation that a lawyer designated to
defend the insured has a client-lawyer relationship with the
insured. The insurer is not, simply by the fact that it designates
the lawyer, a client of the lawyer. Whether a client-lawyer
relationship also exists between the lawyer and the insurer is
determined under Section 14. Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,
§134, cmt. f at 408.[4]
The
Restatement also enumerates several potential conflicts
between the interests of the insured and the insurer in which the
lawyer’s duty to the insured would be paramount. These would
include an attorney’s obligation to disobey insurance company
litigation instructions where they could result in significantly
increased risk of liability in excess of policy limits; and
an obligation not to disclose confidential information
regarding the insured’s case that may jeopardize the insured’s
insurance coverage. Id: at 409-10. The
Restatement also discusses situations in which the defense
counsel, because of conflicting duties to the insured and the
carrier, would be required to withdraw from representation of both
“clients”: With
respect to events or information that create a conflict of
interest between insured and insurer, the lawyer must proceed in
the best interests of the insured consistent with the lawyer’s
duty not to assist client fraud ... and, if applicable, consistent
with the lawyer’s duties to the insurer as co-client . . . .
If the designated lawyer finds it impossible so to proceed,
the lawyer must withdraw from representation of both clients . . .
. Id: at 410. In
short, while state and federal decisions in New Hampshire and the Restatement
provide no definitive answer to the nature of the tripartite
relationship, the Dumas decision suggests that New
Hampshire has adopted the “dual client” model.
More importantly, under either model, the relationship
between insured and designated defense counsel is always that of
attorney-client. The
duties that arise out of this relationship provide the basis for a
definitive response to the question before the Committee.
B. The
Attorney’s Duty to Maintain Client Confidences: The
employment of third-party auditors to review the billing records
of insurance defense counsel implicates professional conduct rules
and common law evidentiary doctrines that protect the
confidentiality of attorney-client communications and attorney
work product. Rule
1.6(a) of the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct states: A
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of
a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out
the representation . . . . Comments
to the ABA Model Code and separate comments to the New Hampshire
rule underscore the “inviolate” character of client
confidences and the “extreme and irrevocable” nature of an act
of disclosure. The
duty to protect client confidentiality (and the duty of undivided
loyalty) also constitute the two essential components of a
lawyer’s fiduciary duty to his or her client. The
rule of confidentiality of Rule 1.6(a) is greater in scope than
the common law, attorney-client privilege.
Most significantly, the latter extends only to confidential
“communications” of the client that are “made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services to the client” NHRE 502(b).
Rule 1.6(a), by contrast, applies “to all information
relating to the representation, whatever its source.”
ABA Model Code Comments. Similarly,
material protected by the attorney work product doctrine is
encompassed by, but less extensive than, material falling within
the broad parameters of Rule 1.6.
The work product doctrine appears, among other places, at
Rule 35(b)(2) of the New Hampshire Superior Court Rules, which
allows discovery of “trial preparation” materials of an
attorney “only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his
case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.”
Even greater protection is afforded to “opinion work
product,” which includes the “mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of any attorney or other
representatives of a party concerning the litigation.”
Rule 35(b)(2). See
also, United States v. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 129 F.3d. 681, 688 (1st Cir. 1997)
(recognizing, but not resolving, issue of whether confidentiality
of attorney “opinion work product” can be waived through
selective disclosure of material to audit agency.) An
attorney’s billing records--particularly those generated by
insurance defense counsel in the detail required to meet typical
billing guidelines--will inevitably contain information protected
by the broad reach of Rule 1.6.
In most cases, the billing records will also contain either
direct or implicit descriptions of privileged client
communications; and will reveal steps of trial preparation that
under most circumstances would not be discoverable by the opposing
party. Whether
the tripartite relationship is seen as one of “dual
representation” or of client/third party payor, the ethical and
fiduciary duties of insurance defense counsel mandate that these
confidential and strategically-sensitive materials be protected
from disclosure unless their release is “impliedly authorized”
to carry out the representation; or the client (the insured)
“consents after consultation.”
Rule 1.6(a). 1.
Implied Authorization: Rule 1.6(a) eliminates the
requirement for client consent where the disclosures are
“impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation.” Examples
of such implied authorizations include discussions within a law
firm and disclosures made in settlement negotiations.
ABA Model Code Comments. In
addition, if the insured is considered the sole client in the
tripartite relationship, submission of the bills to the
insurer for payment would be “impliedly authorized”
since the insured has contracted, in part, for a defense funded by
the carrier. In
further support of this conclusion, the Committee notes that most
insurance contracts include a “cooperation clause” whereby the
insured agrees to cooperate in its defense under the insurance
agreement[5],
and that New Hampshire extends the work product protection to
disclosures made to the insurer in the course of trial
preparation. See also Colorado Ethics Opinion 107 (9/18/99)
(disclosure to insurer/third party payor impliedly authorized). However,
regardless of the tripartite model adopted within a jurisdiction,
disclosure of detailed bills to outside agencies does not further,
or “carry out,” the client’s representation.
Third-party auditors are used not to advance the course of
the litigation, but rather to assist the insurer in monitoring
compliance with billing guidelines and cutting the overall cost of
litigation. The
“implied authorization” exception to Rule 1.6(a)’s general
prohibition of release of confidential information must be
narrowly construed in light of the fundamental importance of
confidentiality to the effective representation of the client.
See also, South Carolina Ethics Adv. Op.
97-22 (“the comments regarding ‘disclosures impliedly
authorized’ are narrowly written.”) One
commentator has noted: It
cannot reasonably be argued . . . that an insured “impliedly
authorizes” disclosure of information relating to the
representation to outside auditors.
Inasmuch as defense attorneys’ provision of their bills
to outside legal auditors does not enhance that quality of the
insured’s representation, does not increase the likelihood of
success, does not strengthen or promote the attorney-client
relationship, and does not otherwise benefit the insured, the
narrow implied authorization exception surely is not wide enough
to allow disclosures to outside legal auditors. Richmond,
“Of Legal Audits and Legal Ethics,” Defense Counsel Journal,
October 1998 at 520. The
ethical obligations of insurance defense counsel would not be
different if the bills were submitted to the insurer for
transmission to a third-party auditor, rather than directly by the
lawyer to the third-party auditor.
An attorney’s obligation to protect client
confidentialities cannot be met simply by avoiding direct,
personal involvement in the disclosure.
“The Rules of Professional Conduct, and in particular the
duties of loyalty, communication and competence, do not allow an
attorney tacitly to participate in conduct that may jeopardize his
or her client’s legal interests.”
Colorado Ethics Op. 107 (9/19/99), (citing Maryland
State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics Op. 99-7 for proposition that
the attorney must “request that an insurer not forward
confidential material to a third-party auditor.”) In
sum, an attorney may not ethically disclose billing statements to
a third-party auditor--or to the insurer for transmission to the
third-party auditor-- without first meeting the “consent after
consultation” requirement of Rule 1.6(a). 2.
Consent After Consultation:
“‘Consultation’ denotes communication of information
reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the
significance of the matter in question.”
(NHBA Ethics Opinion #1988-89/13 Confidentiality:
Provision of Information to Funding Source, 2/9/89).
At a minimum, informed consent would require the attorney
to advise the insured that disclosure of billing statements to
third-party auditors creates a risk of waiver of evidentiary
privileges that could allow access to, and adverse use of, the
information by the opposing party.
See United States v. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding
that in providing billing statements of law firms to the Defense
Contract Auditing Agency [the auditing arm of the Department of
Defense], MIT waived the attorney-client privilege and traditional
work product doctrine protections otherwise applicable to the
billing statements.) In
addition, while the insured’s consent might be sought at the
outset of the representation (or even as a provision in the
insurance agreement itself), serious questions could be raised
about the sufficiency of the “consultation” and examination of
the consequences of disclosure that could occur at these very
early stages. The
preferable course would be to obtain approval at the time of
billing--when the contents of the statements are available for
review by the client.
C. The
Attorney’s Duty to Exercise Independent Judgment: An
attorney’s duty of undivided loyalty to the client is the second
underpinning of the attorney’s fiduciary duty; and finds
expression in professional conduct rules relating to conflicts of
interest. Rule
1.7 sets forth the general rule.[6]
Rule 1.8 then lists specified problem areas -- including
the conflict that can arise in a third party payor situation such
as that involved in the tripartite relationship -- and mandates
that the attorney not accept compensation from another if it will
interfere with the independent judgment of the attorney for his or
her client: (f)
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client
from one other than the client unless: (1)
the client consents after consultation; (2)
there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and (3)
information relating to representation of a client is protected as
required by Rule 1.6. As
has been discussed previously, it is difficult to identify a
benefit to the insured in the submission of defense bills to third
party auditors. On
the other hand, the downside -- both in the potential waiver of
common law protections and the increased circulation of sensitive
and potentially embarrassing information -- is clear.
Under
these circumstances, the insurance defense counsel asked, or
required, to seek the consent of the insured for outside review of
billing statements is placed in a serious ethical dilemma.
This has led several jurisdictions to question, and in some
cases find unethical, the lawyer’s participation in the process: (A)
requirement that defense counsel seek or obtain the informed
consent of the insured to disclose client confidences or secrets
in billings to be submitted to the . . . outside auditing service
would invoke the prohibitions in RPC 1.7(b) and 1.8(f) and place
defense counsel in an impossible situation, requiring withdrawal
from the representation. This
is because it is almost inconceivable that it would ever be in the
client’s best interests to disclose confidences or secrets to a
third party. The
issue is not, “what does it matter or does the client care?”
Rather, the question my be, “under what circumstances, if
any, would independent counsel for the client recommend that the
client consent to disclosure of confidences or secrets to third
persons?” If there
is the slightest risk of embarrassment to the client or waiver of
privileged information, independent counsel would have an
affirmative duty to recommend against disclosure. Silence
in the face of an affirmative duty to recommend against disclosure
would be as egregious as a recommendation to consent to
disclosure. Defense
counsel who was required to seek or to obtain the insured’s
consent to disclosure would proceed to do so only by advancing
counsel’s own self-interests or the interests of a third party,
the insurer, in contravention of rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(f).
Thus, a “requirement” to seek or obtain the client’s
consent to disclosure would put defense counsel in an ethical
dilemma requiring withdrawal from the representation.
Washington
State Bar Ass’n Formal Opinion No. 195 (8/16/99).
Applying the same objective, “disinterested lawyer”
standard, Mississippi and North Carolina have expressed similar
concerns. State Bar
of North Carolina proposed Ethics Opinion 10.
See also Opinion of the Mississippi Bar No.
246 (4/8/99) (“consent may not be requested by the lawyer if a
disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not
agree to such disclosure.”) The
rationale of these opinions are persuasive.[7] New
Hampshire applies the same “disinterested lawyer” standard in
determining whether an attorney may ask a client to proceed with
representation despite an existing, disclosed conflict.
In re Boyle’s Case, 136 N.H. 21, 24 (1992).
Barring circumstances in which the benefits of disclosure
to the insured would outweigh any potential harm -- circumstances
that are difficult to imagine -- an attorney may not, ethically,
comply with an insurer’s request to seek the consent of a client
to disclose billing statements to third party auditors even when
informed consent is possible.
Rule 1.7 and 1.8(f).[8]
D. The
Exchange of Billing Statements and
Case Information Between Insurance Defense Counsel and
the Carrier: Because
of the unique nature of the tripartite relationship between
defense counsel, client/insured and insurance carrier, the same
ethical concerns are not implicated by the exchange of case
information (and billing materials) between insurance defense
counsel and the carrier. Several
factors support this conclusion. First,
the insurance contract will typically obligate the company to
defend and indemnify claims falling within policy coverage
(subject to deductible provisions). The policy also will typically contain a provision requiring
the insured’s cooperation in its defense.
Accordingly, the insured’s execution of this contract
will generally constitute an implicit consent (or “implied
authorization” for purposes of Rule 1.6(a)) for the exchange of
information necessary for the carrier to monitor and evaluate the
case; and meet its own contractual obligation to reimburse defense
counsel. In
addition, New Hampshire Superior Court Rule 35(b)(2) provides
explicit protection for trial preparation materials of a party’s
insurer; the Restatement similarly recognizes common law
protection for information exchanged between defense counsel and
carrier; and the Dumas decision, through its adoption of a
“dual client” model, would appear to extend the protection of
the attorney/client privilege to communications between defense
counsel and carrier. These
established protections may well disappear, however, if privileged
information is provided to a third party auditor.
This risk of irreparable harm to the client/insured, which
arises uniquely on third party auditor scenario, is a substantial
basis for the Committee’s opinion. CONCLUSION The
Committee concludes (1) that an attorney may not ethically submit
detailed billing statements to outside auditors without prior
consultation and informed consent of the client,
Rule 1.6(a); and (2) that an attorney may not ethically
comply with a request by or requirement of, an insurance company to
seek consent for, or recommend, disclosure of detailed billing
statements to a third party auditor unless a disinterested attorney,
based on the circumstances of the case, could conclude that the
benefits of disclosure to the client would outweigh any potential
risks.[9]
Such circumstances would rarely, if ever, exist. [1]
Ethical
issues relating to the use of outside auditors have now been
addressed in a multitude of jurisdictions.
See, e.g. Alabama Office of General Counsel
Opinion Letter (June 1988); Alabama Ethics Op. RO-98-02 (Oct.
1998); Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. 99-1 (1999); Colorado Bar
Ass’n Ethics Committee Op. No. 107 (Sept. 18, 1999); District
of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm. Op. 290 (Apr. 20, 1999);
Florida Bar Staff Op. 20591 (Dec. 31, 1997), Hawaii Office of
Disciplinary Counsel Formal Op. No. 36 (March 25, 1999); Indiana
Ethics Op. No. 4 of 1998; Kentucky Ethics Op. E-368 (1994);
Kentucky Ethics Op. R-404 (June 1998); Maryland State Bar
Ass’n Comm. on Ethics Op. 99-7 (Dec. 1998); Massachusetts
Ethics Op. 1997-T53 (1997); Massachusetts Ethics Op., Mass.
Lawyers Weekly No. 24-004-00. Opinion of the Mississippi Bar No. 246; Missouri Ethics
Informal Op. 980124 (1998); New York State Bar Ass’n Op. 716
(March 1999); North Carolina State Bar Formal Ethics Op. 98-10
(July 16, 1998); Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Comm. Formal Op.
1999-157 (June 1999); Pennsylvania Comm. Informal Op. 97-119
(Oct. 7, 1997); South Carolina Ethics Op. 97-22 (1997),
Tennessee Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143 (June 14, 1999); Utah
Ethics Op. 98-03 (April 17, 1998); Vermont Bar Op. 98-7 (1998);
Virginia Ethics Op. 1723 (Nov. 1998); Washington State Bar
Ass’n Formal Op. 195 (1999); and Washington State Bar Ass’n
Informal Op. Re: Inquiry No. 1758 (April 1997); Wisconsin State
Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics Formal Op. E-99-1 (1999). [2]
It is
reported that “14 cents of every liability claim dollar goes
to defense costs.” Richmond, “Of Legal Audits and Legal Ethics,” Defense
Counsel Journal, October 1998 at 512, n. 3, citing The
Fact Book 1998: Property/Casualty Insurance Facts 54
(Insurance Information Institute 1997). [3]
In Gibbs
v. Lappies, slip op. No. 92-159-M, (D.N.H. 8/10/93), the
court (McAuliffe, J.) reached a different conclusion regarding
the nature of the tripartite relationship.
The court held, as part of an order denying a law
firm’s motion to withdraw due to failure of the insurance
company to pay its bills that “when an attorney is retained by
an insurance company to provide a defense under a liability
policy, the attorney’s client is the insured, not the
insurer.” The
court cited treatise authority and decisions from Mississippi
(federal) and New York (state) for this conclusion.
The Dumas decision was neither cited nor analyzed.
[4]
Section 14
outlines the requirements for formation of an attorney client
relationship: A
relationship of client and lawyer arises when: (1)
a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the
lawyer provide legal services for the person; and either (a)
the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or (b)
the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person
reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services; or (2)
a tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to provide
the services. [5]
See
In Re: Environmental Ins. Declaratory Judgment Actions,
612 A.2d 1338, 1342 (N.J. Super. 1992) (“insureds are
generally required to provide all such information and
assistance as the insurer may require.”) [6]
Rule 1.7 states: (a)
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1)
the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and (2)
each client consents after consultation and with knowledge of
the consequences. (b)
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by
the lawyer’s own interests, unless: (1)
the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and (2)
the client consents after consultation and with knowledge of the
consequences. When
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and the advantages and
risks involved. [7]
In Opinion
No. 1988-89/13, Confidentiality:
Provision of Information to Funding Source, the
Committee reviewed the ethical obligations of New Hampshire
Legal Assistance (NHLA) and the New Hampshire Pro Bono Referral
System in connection with periodic, on-site audits by the Legal
Service Corporation (a quasi-governmental agency).
The audits are conducted by the LSC to ensure the
“integrity” of programs that it supports through financial
grants. The
Committee concluded, under Rule 1.6 that NHLA must protect the
identify of clients, addresses of clients, client eligibility
information, client trust fund information, and client
identifying information in other files – including client
grievance files – unless the client consents after
consultation or has impliedly authorized the release. The
Committee found, however, that NHLA or Pro Bono could
ethically request clients to waive the protections found in Rule
1.6 – assuming “extreme care (is) employed in soliciting
client consent” to reveal the information.
The Committee noted: It
would be irresponsible to ignore the important part such audits
and reviews play in guaranteeing that the limited funds
available for legal assistance to be indigent are not
squandered, wasted or purloined. The
public policy underpinnings of this opinion (the need for
governmentally-funded legal services for the indigent), do not
exist in the situation now before the Committee.
Moreover, readily available alternatives exist for
insurance carriers (in-house auditing, for example) that would
eliminate the risks and related ethical concerns triggered by
providing privileged information to third party auditors. [8]
One
solution to the defense counsel’s conflict would be to
recommend that the insured obtain independent counsel for advice
on whether to consent to the audit process (and for advice
regarding whether refusal to provide consent would violate the
cooperation clause of the policy). [9]
Variations
in the audit process could affect its analysis.
This opinion addresses only the use of independent, third
party auditors to review detailed billing statements during the
course of ongoing litigation.
No effort has been made to analyze, in detail,
modifications to the current system discussed in recent
commentaries including (1) the employment of in-house auditors
by insurance companies; (2) modification of insurance contracts
to include consent to the submission of bills to outside
auditors; (3) delay of the audit process until the completion of
the litigation; (4) notification to the insured in retainer
letters that auditors will be used to review defense bills; or
(5) elimination of specificity requirements in billing
statements. See generally, Richmond, supra at
522-23.
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