Coverage for EIFS Claims under the Standard
CGL Policy
T. Eugene Allen, III
I.
Exterior
insulation finish system (EIFS, sometimes known as artificial stucco or fake
stucco) is a building system that integrates a resinous exterior cladding with
a continuous layer of insulation, wrapped around the exterior of
buildings. These systems are usually
comprised of five component layers: an exterior finish, a reinforcing mesh to
protect the system, an insulator (normally expanded polystyrene), an adhesive
substance binding the insulator to the building and a substrate to which the
insulator is attached.
Generally,
different manufacturers market EIFS products as systems. The system is only one component of a weather
envelope or system. Unlike most other
wall cladding products (such as siding or brick), the EIFS system is actually
created on site and combined with other materials, such as wall framing,
flashings, and the like.
The
product, originally developed in Europe, became popular with American builders
in the early 1980s. Unlike other
exterior systems, it adjusts readily to the particular design of the building,
making it very popular with architects and builders looking for new
designs. The function of EIFS is to act
as a barrier between the outside elements and the remainder of the structure.
In
many parts of the country, especially areas that experience high heat and
humidity, property owners began encountering problems with moisture entering
the structure. A rash of litigation
ensued in which, typically, it is claimed that installers of EIFS failed to put
a base coat at the termination of the EIFS system, failed to install sealant
and failed to install flashing. It is
also usually alleged that the installer failed to backwrap entrances and
windows and did not use proper caulking techniques where the EIFS terminated.
A
typical complaint will allege that the defective installation of EIFS has
caused moisture intrusion, resulting in damage to structural members, flooring
and other parts of the building.
Further, byproducts of moisture, such as mold and mildew, are usually
alleged. Generally, it is claimed that
the only way to fix the problem is to reclad the entire structure.
The
usual defendants in an EIFS case are the EIFS installer, the EIFS seller or
distributor, the general contractor and the EIFS manufacturer. The building owner usually claims that the
EIFS product was defectively manufactured or sold as a defective product. Frequently, it is claimed that the local
seller had a duty to verify the ability of the installer. It is usually alleged that the general
contractor had overall responsibility and, in particular, failed to supervise
the EIFS installer or verify that party’s ability to install the EIFS system.
As in
other construction defect cases, the problems may not appear until many years
after the installation. The plaintiff
may not be the original owner of the structure.
Termite infestation is sometimes alleged as an additional problem caused
by the defective installation of EIFS.
In those cases, it is not unusual to find a pest control company
included as a defendant.
II.
Typical Allegations in Complaint
In an
EIFS case, the following causes of action are frequently found:
1. Negligence
or negligent supervision (EIFS installer, seller, general contractor and
manufacturer);
2. Breach
of express warranties (EIFS installer, seller, general contractor and
manufacturer);
3. Breach
of implied warranty of habitability (general contractor);
4. Breach
of implied warranty of merchantability (EIFS seller and manufacturer);
5. Breach
of implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose (EIFS seller and
manufacturer);
6. Breach
of implied warranty of workmanlike service (EIFS installer and general
contractor);
7. Unfair
or deceptive trade practices, usually based on deception of consumers (EIFS
installer, seller, general contractor and manufacturer);
8. Strict
liability (EIFS seller).
III.
Policy Provisions
Various
versions of the ISO Commercial General Liability form policy may be involved,
since the construction may have been completed years before the suit. The 1986 and subsequent versions (herein the
“Policy”) usually have the following provisions:
The Insuring
Agreement provides that:
[The insurer] will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend any “suit” seeking those damages.
The
Policy applies to “bodily injury” and “property damage” only if they are caused
by an “occurrence” and if the injury or damage occurs during the policy period.
It contains the following exclusions providing that the policy does not apply
to:
a. “Bodily
injury” or “property damage” expected or intended from the standpoint of the
insured . . .
b. “Bodily
injury” or “property damage” for which the insured is obligated to pay damages
by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement. This exclusion does not apply to liability
for damages:
(1) Assumed in a
contract or agreement that is an “insured contract,” provided the “bodily
injury” or “property damage” occurs subsequent to the execution of the contract
or agreement; or
(2)
That the insured would have in the absence of the contract or agreement.
k. “Property damage” to:
. . .
(5) That
particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or
subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing
operations, if the “property damage" arises out of those operations; or
(6) That
particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced
because “your work” was incorrectly performed on it.
. . . Paragraph (6) of this exclusion does not apply to
“property damage” included in the “products-completed operations hazard.”
l. “Property damage” to
“your product” arising out of it or any part of it.
m. “Property
damage” to “your work” arising out of it or any part of it and included in the
“products-completed operations hazard.”
This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of
which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor.
n. “Property
damage” to “impaired property” or property that has not been physically
injured, arising out of:
(1) A
defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in “your product” or
“your work;” or
(2) A delay
or failure by you or anyone acting on your behalf to perform a contract or
agreement in accordance with its terms.
This exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of other property arising out of sudden and accidental physical injury to “your product” or “your work” after it has been put to its intended use.
The Policy contains the
following pertinent definitions:
1.
“Bodily
injury” means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person,
including death resulting from any of these at any time.
. . .
5. “Impaired property” means tangible
property, other than “your product” or “your work,” that cannot be used or is
less useful because:
a. It incorporates “your product” or “your
work” that is known or thought to be defective, deficient, inadequate or
dangerous; or
b. You have failed to
fulfill the terms of a contract or agreement; if such property can be restored
to use by:
a. The repair, replacement, adjustment or
removal of “your product” or “your work;” or
b. Your
fulfilling the terms of the contract or agreement.
6. “Insured Contract” means:
. . .
f. That part of any other contract or
agreement pertaining to your business . . . under which you assume the tort
liability of another party to pay for “bodily injury” or “property damage” to a
third party or organization. Tort
liability means a liability that would be imposed by law in the absence of any
contract or agreement.
. . .
9. “Occurrence” means an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions.
. . .
11. a. “Products-completed operations hazard” includes all “bodily injury” and “property damage” occurring away from premises you own or rent and arising out of “your product” or “your work” except:
(1) Products that are still in your physical possession; or
(2) Work that has not yet been completed or abandoned.
b. “Your work” will be deemed completed at
the earliest of the following times:
(1) When all of the work called for in your
contract has been completed.
(2) When all of the work to be done at the
site has been completed if your contract calls for work at more than one site.
(3) When that part of the work done at a job
site has been put to its intended use by any person or organization other than
another contractor or subcontractor working on the same project.
Work
that may need service, maintenance, correction, repair or replacement, but
which is otherwise complete, will be treated as completed.
12. “Property damage” means:
a. Physical injury to tangible property,
including all resulting loss of use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur
at the time of the physical injury that caused it; or
b. Loss of use of tangible property that is
not physically injured. All such loss
shall be deemed to occur at the time of the “occurrence” that caused it.
. . .
14. “Your product” means:
a. Any
goods or products, other than real property, manufactured, sold, handled,
distributed or disposed of by:
(1) You . . .
“Your product” includes:
a. Warranties or representations made at
any time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use
of “your product;” . . .
15. “Your work” means:
a. Work or operations performed by you or
on your behalf; and
b. Materials, parts or equipment furnished
in connection with such work or operations.
“Your work” includes:
a. Warranties or representations made at
any time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use
of “your work;” and
b. The providing of or failure to provide
warnings or instructions.
General Rules of Policy Construction
Exclusions in a policy are
to be read independently of each other, and not cumulatively.[1] Thus:
[i]f any one exclusion
applies there should be no coverage, regardless of inferences that might be
argued on the basis of exceptions or qualifications contained in other
exclusions. There is no instance in
which an exclusion can properly be regarded as inconsistent with another
exclusion, since they bear no relationship with one another.[2]
The duty to defend is
broader than the duty to indemnify under an insurance policy. The insurer's duty to defend depends upon
whether the facts alleged in a complaint, if proved, would afford coverage.[3]
V.
General Overview of Construction Defect Coverage
Since construction defect
claims are typically found to be within the “Insuring Agreement” of the CGL
policy, coverage disputes concerning those claims often focus on the policy exclusions,
which limit the coverage granted in the insuring agreement. The exclusions address a basic issue: How
does the policy exclude from coverage damages resulting from “business risks?”
Generally, a liability
insurer is not obligated to pay for the faulty workmanship of its insured.[4]
The risks insured under the CGL policy are distinct from the simple risk of
doing business.[5] Most of the business risk exclusions draw the
line between covered and uncovered claims according to the nature of the harm
caused, rather than the nature of the conduct causing the harm. Construction defects are generally the result
of poor workmanship or poor design. The
coverage determination usually depends upon whether the resulting harm was
damage to the insured’s own work, which is generally not covered, or damage to
the work of others, which is covered.
For example, in C.D. Walters Construction Co. v. Fireman’s
Insurance Co.,[6]
the South Carolina Court of Appeals said that the CGL policy does not cover
faulty workmanship but rather faulty workmanship that causes an accident. In Walters,
the insured had agreed to excavate and prepare a pond on the claimant’s
property. The complaint against the
insured alleged that the insured cut and damaged trees that he had been
instructed to avoid and that he had dug a ditch against the claimant’s specific
instructions. The court concluded that
the damage sought by the claimant was to that particular part of the claimant’s
property on which the insured was working, and did not involve accidental
injury to other property.[7] In Isle
of Palms Pest Control Co. v. Monticello Insurance Co.[8]
the court stated:
A
general liability policy is intended to provide coverage for tort liability for
physical damage to the property of others; it is not intended to provide
coverage for the insured’s contractual liability which causes economic losses.
It is for this reason that a general liability insurance policy typically does
not cover claims of faulty workmanship, but instead covers claims of faulty workmanship
that causes an accident.[9]
VI.
Insuring Agreement and Definition of Occurrence
The CGL policy requires the
happening of an “occurrence,” which is defined as an accident including
continuous exposure to conditions. Some
courts have found that negligent performance of work by a contractor is an
occurrence.[10]
In Stroup Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,[11]
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a complaint alleging faulty
workmanship did not allege an “occurrence” or accident. In Stroup,
it is important to note that there were no allegations of negligence against
the insured. Therefore, the court had an
easy time in concluding that the action was only for breach of contract due to
faulty workmanship, and therefore not covered under the policy. In the EIFS cases, the portion of the
definition of “occurrence” relating to continuous exposure to conditions is
usually the situation alleged to have caused the damages in question.
VII.
Definition of “Property Damage”
The CGL policy defines
“property damage” to mean:
a. Physical injury to tangible property,
including all resulting loss of use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur
at the time of the physical injury that caused it; or
b. Loss
of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss shall be deemed to occur at the
time of the “occurrence” that caused it.
If the faulty workmanship
causes physical injury to tangible property, other than the work itself, courts
generally find “property damage” within the policy.[12]
The issue of whether “property damage” has occurred may arise in the context of
a defective product being incorporated into tangible property. Some courts have held that this constitutes
“property damage.”[13]
Generally, coverage for the incorporation of defective products into tangible
property is determined not on the basis of whether a defect exists, but rather
by whether consequential damages have occurred as a result of the defect.[14]
In EIFS cases, the complaint
usually alleges that the incorporation of the allegedly defective EIFS caused
damage to other components of the structure.
VIII.
Diminution in Value of the Structure
The CGL policy defines
property damage as “physical injury to tangible property, including all
resulting loss of use of that property.”
There appears to be a split of authority as to whether the term
“property damage” includes tangible property that has been diminished in value
irrespective of any actual physical injury to that property. Usually, the complaint alleges physical
damage to components of the structure in addition to depreciated value.
The majority of courts that
construed the 1973 version of the CGL policy have held that intangible damages,
such as diminution of value, do not constitute property damage.[15]
For example, in Aetna Life & Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Patrick Industries, Inc.,[16]
the insured, a supplier, sued its CGL insurer that refused coverage for the
supplier’s settlement with a manufacturer to whom the insured supplied
defective particle board that was incorporated into the manufacturer’s
campers. The court of appeals, reversing
the lower court, held that the CGL policy did not cover diminution in value of
the campers that contained the defective components supplied by the
insured. The Indiana court recited the
history of the “property damage” definition under the 1966 and 1973 versions of
the ISO policy. The prior version did
not include the word “physical,” that was added in 1973. The majority of courts construing the 1966
version held that depreciation was included under that policy’s definition of
“property damage.”[17] In Marathon
Plastics, Inc. v. International Insurance Co.,[18]
the court held that damage to the completed product, exclusive of the value of
the defective component, did constitute damage to tangible personal property
within the meaning of the policy.
IX.
Allegations of Strict Liability
A complaint may allege an
insured seller is strictly liable for any defects caused by the allegedly
defective product. As previously noted,
policy exclusions focus on the nature of the harm caused, rather than the
specific basis for the claim. In other
words, if the insured’s product causes damage to other property, then coverage
may exist. Consequently, coverage for
the strict liability claim should depend upon the nature of the damage alleged.
X.
Applicability of Particular Exclusions
A.
The “Contract” Exclusion
The typical CGL policy will
exclude:
b. “Bodily injury” or “property damage”
for which the insured is obligated to pay damages by reason of the assumption
of liability in a contract or agreement.
This exclusion does not apply to liability for damages:
(1) Assumed in a contract or agreement that
is an “insured contract,” provided the “bodily injury” or “property damage”
occurs subsequent to the execution of the contract or agreement; or
(2) That the insured would have in the
absence of the contract or agreement.
Causes of action for breach
of express and implied warranties are frequently alleged in EIFS cases. The contract exclusion was relied upon by the
court in TGA Development, Inc. v.
Northern Insurance Co.[19]
In that case, applying Minnesota law, the court found no coverage for a claim
arising from the construction of a unit in an office building. The claim against the insured included
allegations of breach of warranty. The
appellate court affirmed the lower court grant of summary judgment to insurer,
based upon the contractual liability exclusion.
It should be noted there was no negligence claim against the insured.
The contract exclusion says
that it does not apply to liabilities the insured would have in the absence of
a contract or agreement. This exclusion,
therefore, may not apply to implied warranties alleged to have arisen by law,
rather than by contract. This
exclusion, however, should avoid coverage for the claim for breach of express warranties.
B. The “Your Product” Exclusion
The
typical CGL policy excludes:
l.
“Property
damage” to “your product” arising out of it or any part of it.
. . .
14. “Your product” means:
a. Any
goods or products, other than real property, manufactured, sold handled,
distributed or disposed of by:
(1) You . . .
“Your
product” includes:
a. Warranties or representations made at
any time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use
of “your product;” . . .
The South Carolina Court of
Appeals upheld a denial of coverage based, in part, on this exclusion in Nautilus Insurance Co. v. Long.[20] There the insurer brought a declaratory
action against its insured, a roofing contractor. The insured had contracted to put a new roof
surface on an existing building. During
the work, rainwater from a heavy storm leaked through the roof “because the
roofing company failed to cover the roof surface.”[21] The rainwater allegedly caused considerable
damage to the building (a hospital) and the equipment in the building.
The building owner sought a
declaration that the insurer could be liable for the loss of a warranty from
the roofing material manufacturer based on the roofer’s failure to cover the
roof. The lower court ruled the insurer
had a duty to defend the negligence action against its insured but that the
policy did not cover the loss of the warranty from the roofing
manufacturer. The Court of Appeals
agreed, relying on the “your product” and “your work” exclusions. The property damage in question, the loss of
the right to the twenty year roof warranty, was to the very work performed by
the insured and it arose out of the work.
Although the court did not
reference a contract exclusion, the court said that the insurer did not provide
coverage for “contractual liability of the insured for any type of economic
loss resulting from the failure of the product or completed work not being that
for which the hospital board bargained.”[22]
The court went on to hold that the “product” that the insured contracted to
supply was the roof that was to carry a twenty-year warranty. It held that the insurer was not responsible
for the loss of this warranty. This exclusion should avoid coverage for any
claims of damage to the EIFS product itself.
It probably does not avoid coverage for damage to other portions of the
structure as a result of “product” defects.
C. The “Your Work” Exclusion
m. “Property damage” to “your work” arising
out of it or any part of it and included in the “products-completed operations
hazard.”
This
exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the
damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor.
15. “Your
work” means:
a. Work or operations performed by you or
on your behalf; and
b. Materials, parts or equipment furnished
in connection with such work or operations.
“Your work”
includes:
a. Warranties or representations made at
any time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use
of “your work;” and
b. The providing of or failure to provide
warnings or instructions.
The more difficult
determination is usually whether the claim alleges damage only to the insured’s
work or other property damage caused by the insured’s work. Two recent cases illustrate this problem. In Sapp
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,[23]
the appellate court affirmed a lower court judgment in a declaratory action
brought by a contractor’s insurer. The
insured was hired to conduct repairs and renovations to the claimant’s home. As part of the work, the insured made repairs
to floor joists and installed hardwood flooring. Apparently, the insured failed to adequately
protect the hardwood flooring from a moisture problem under the home. The court recited the general principle that
the “business risk” exclusions are designed to exclude coverage for defective
workmanship by the insured, stating that:
[t]he
insured, as a source of goods or services, may be liable as a matter of
contract law to make good on products or work which is defective or otherwise
unsuitable because it is lacking in some capacity. This may even extend to an obligation to
completely replace or rebuild the deficient product or work. This liability, however, is not what the
coverages in question are designed to protect against. The coverage applicable under the CGL policy
is for tort liability for injury to persons and damage to other property.[24]
The claimant argued that the
only “work” that would fall under the exclusion would be the failure of the
insured to address and correct the water problem prior to installing the
hardwood floor. The court disagreed,
holding that all the claimed damages related directly to the cost of repair or
replacing the alleged negligent work of the insured -- the failure to correct
the moisture problem and the negligent installation of the floors. Any damages to the house during the removal
of the floor, and the restoration of the house to its condition prior to the
work, were merely incidental to the claimed damages from the services the
insured negligently performed and for which he contracted.
A contrasting decision is Pekin Insurance Co. v. Richard Marker
Associates, Inc.[25]
There, the appellate court reversed a lower court judgment in favor of the
insurer in a declaratory action. The
underlying complaint alleged that the insured negligently installed a HVAC
system that did not operate properly, so that resulting condensation caused
extensive water damage to window trim, furniture, carpeting, flooring and
walls.
The Illinois court also
recited the basic rule that the CGL policy is intended to provide coverage for
damage other than costs associated with repairing or replacing the insured’s
defective work. The court went further
and said that the CGL policy does not cover an accident of faulty workmanship
but rather faulty workmanship that causes an accident, and found that such was
alleged by the underlying complaint. The
claim was that the faulty workmanship caused an accident in the form of
continuous or repeated condensation that dripped and damaged furniture. The court said this was more than an
allegation that the building itself was defective. Therefore, it held that the allegations of
the underlying complaint potentially fell within the policy coverage so as to
give the insurer duty to defend.
The EIFS applicator
traditionally installs the foam board and the “lamina” acrylic glue coating
that is about a sixteenth of an inch thick.
In most cases, the structural sheathing to which the foam board is
applied and the studs supporting the sheathing are generally installed by
others. In residential construction the
framing crew would install the studs and the sheathing board. The EIFS installer would then attach the foam
board and the synthetic coating. In all
probability the only components included within the EIFS installer’s work would
be foam board and the lamina. Everything
else would be the other subcontractor’s work.
This division of work is crucial to coverage under a number of the
exclusions.
The
CGL policy’s definition of “your work” includes “warranties . . . made at any time
with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use of ‘your
work’.” If the “contract” exclusion does
not preclude coverage for the allegations of breach of implied warranties of
fitness and use for a particular purpose, then the “your work” exclusion should
accomplish this and prevent these causes of action from being covered.
D.
The “Property Damage” Exclusion
Exclusion
(k) is generally referred to as the property damage exclusion. It probably will not affect the typical EIFS
case. Courts have limited exclusion
(k)(5)’s application to damage that occurs while operations are being performed by the insured.[26]
E.
The Impaired Property Exclusion
m. “Property damage” to “your work” arising
out of it or any part of it and included in the “products-completed operations
hazard.”
This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or
the work out of which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a
subcontractor.
Exclusion (m) is sometimes
referred to as the “impaired property” exclusion. It avoids coverage for property damage to
“impaired property” or property that has not been physically injured arising
out of the insured’s work. “Impaired
property” is defined as tangible property, other than the insured’s work, that
is less useful because it incorporates the insured’s work that is claimed to be
defective, if such property can be
restored to use by the repair or replacement of the insured’s work. While other “business risk” exclusions focus
on the cost of repair of the insured’s own work, the general focus of this
exclusion is the insured’s work causing non-physical damage to other property.
Generally,
to qualify as “impaired property,” the property must be capable of being
restored to use by the “repair, replacement, adjustment or removal of ‘your
work’.” If repair or replacement of the
insured’s work cannot restore the property in question, it will not qualify as
“impaired property.” For example, in Action Auto Stores v. United Capital Insurance
Co.,[27]
the court held that this exclusion did not preclude coverage. The insured was sued for negligent
installation of a gasoline container system, which resulted in pollution of
surrounding property. There was no
evidence that the damage done to surrounding property could be remedied by the
repair or replacement of the insured’s work and this prompted the court’s
ruling. Some courts have ruled that earlier versions of exclusion (m) precluded
coverage only for breach of contract or warranty claims.[28]
Exclusion
(m) contains an exception for the loss of use of other property arising out of
“sudden and accidental physical injury to your work after it has been put to
its intended use.” This exception has
not been analyzed in detail by the courts, so there are few clear guidelines as
to when it will apply.
The
impaired property exclusion may preclude coverage for any alleged diminution in
value of a structure. This would be
true, if the structure could be restored to use by the repair or replacement of
the insured’s work.
F. Intentional Act Exclusion
a. “Bodily injury” or “property damage”
expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured . . .
In
some jurisdictions, application of the intentional act exclusion requires a
two-step analysis. The first question is
whether the act causing the loss was intentional, and the second is whether the
results of the act were intended.[29]
It
may be seen that this reasoning makes it very difficult to opine that the
intentional act exclusion will avoid coverage.
However, if a complaint alleges intentional misrepresentations by an
insured seller as to the effectiveness of the EIFS product and of the
installer’s ability to apply the insulation system, the logical result of such
a misrepresentation could be the insured’s selling of the product. It can certainly be argued that any
consequences that flowed from the insured’s product could have been anticipated
by the insured.
XI.
Trigger of Coverage
Although
various courts have used a variety of coverage trigger theories, the current
trend (for an occurrence policy) seems to be a continuous trigger approach.
A. Triggered Continuously From Time of Injury-Causing Event
Under
this theory, coverage may be triggered at any point from the time of the
underlying injury-causing event until the damage is complete. This allows coverage under any policy in
effect during this entire time. Some
courts have adopted this theory because of the CGL language providing coverage
for “continuous or repeated exposure to conditions.”[30] However, this approach can conflict with the
policy language providing that the damage must occur during the policy period.
B. Triggered at the Time of Injury-In-Fact
Under
this theory, coverage is triggered whenever the damage can be shown in fact to
have first occurred, even if it is before the damage became apparent. The policy in effect at the time of the
injury in fact covers all the ensuing damages.[31]
C.
Triggered Continuously From Time of
Injury-In-Fact While Damage Progresses
Some courts have found that
an injury-in-fact continuous trigger does not penalize the insured by requiring
a manifestation of damage during the policy period. Nor does it penalize the insurer by extending
coverage from the time of the underlying event when no injury has yet
occurred. Of course, this theory will
allow the allocation of risk among insurers when more than one policy is in
effect during the progressive damage.[32]
XI.
Conclusion
Although
the allegations of individual complaints will vary, the following general
observations of coverage may be appropriate:
·
Negligence
causes of action will be covered for allegations of damage to components of the
building other than the EIFS system.
Depreciation of the building may not be covered, depending upon the
particular jurisdiction.
·
Allegations
of breach of express or implied warranties should not be covered.
·
Allegations
of strict liability should be covered for consequential damages to components
of the building other than the EIFS system.
·
Allegations
of unfair trade practices involving the deception of consumers generally should
not be covered, since such allegations necessarily involve intentional conduct.
In some jurisdictions, however, courts may require higher standards for denial
of coverage, based upon claims that the conduct, although intentional, caused
unexpected consequences.
It
should be obvious from the preceding discussion that EIFS cases are rife with
coverage and trigger of coverage issues.
Courts will continue to grapple with methods of determining and
allocating risk in this burgeoning area of construction law.
ENDNOTES
[1] Engineered
Products, Inc. v. Aetna Cas.& Sur. Co , 368 S.E.2d 674 (S.C. Ct. App.
1988); Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405
A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979).
[2] Weedo, 405 A.2d at 795 (quoting George
H. Tinker, Comprehensive General
Liability Insurance – Perspective and Overview, 25 Fed’n Ins. Couns. Q 217, 223 (1975)); see also LaMarche v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 390 So. 2d 325 (Fla.
1980).
[3] United States Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 578 N.E.2d 926 (Ill. 1991); General
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Palmetto Bank, 233 S.E.2d 699 (S.C. 1977).
[4] Stroup Sheet Metal
Works, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 232 S.E.2d 885 (S.C. 1977).
[5] Western Employers
Ins. Co. v. Arciero & Sons, Inc., 194 Cal. Rptr. 688 (Ct. App. 1983); Weedo, 405 A.2d 788; Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Pete Wilson Roofing & Heating Co., 272 So. 2d 232 (Ala. 1972); C.D. Walters
Constr. Co. v. Fireman’s Ins. Co., 316 S.E.2d 709 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984);
Hartford Accid. & Indem. Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 250,
253 (10th Cir. 1988) (CGL policy is not intended to extend to ordinary business
risks such as those relating to the repair or replacement of faulty work or
products but is to protect the insured from liability for damages to property
other than his own work).
[6] 316 S.E.2d at 712.
[7] See also Isle of Palms Pest Control Co.
v. Monticello Ins. Co., 459 S.E.2d 318 (S.C. Ct.App. 1994), aff’d, 468 S.E.2d 304 (S.C. 1996).
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 320 (citations omitted).
[10] Green Constr. Co. v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1000, 1003 (W.D. Mo. 1991), vacated and dismissed, 975 F. Supp. 1365
(W.D. Mo. 1996).
[11] 232 S.E.2d 885, 887
(S.C. 1987).
[12] See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Reeder, 270 Cal. Rptr. 719, 724
(Ct. App. 1990).
[13] Tobi Eng’g, Inc. v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 574 N.E.2d 160, 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
[14] Fresno
Economy Import Used Cars, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 142
Cal. Rptr., 681 (Ct. App. 1977) (defective head gasket in auto is not property
damage even though a policy had no physical injury requirement; no other part
of auto was damaged by defective part); Hamilton Die Cast, Inc., v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 508 F.2d 417, (7th Cir. 1975) (incorporation
of defective component does not constitute property damage, since there was no
harm to other parts).
[15] See, e.g., Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 578
P.2d 1253 (Or. 1978) (the intention to exclude such coverage could be the only
reason for the addition of the word “physical”); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Concrete Units, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 751 (Minn. 1985); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v.
Vieria, 930 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1991); Baywood Corp. v. Maine Bonding & Cas.
Co., 628 A.2d 1029 (Me. 1993).
[16] 645 N.E.2d 656 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995).
[17] See also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1988) (1973 revision was intended to preclude
coverage for intangible injuries such as diminution in value).
[18] 514 N.E.2d 479, 485
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
[19] 62 F.3d 1089 (8th
Cir. 1995).
[20] 431 S.E.2d 624 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1993).
[21] Id. at 624.
[22] Id. at 625.
[23] 486 S.E.2d 71 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1997).
[24] Id. at 75.
[25] 682 N.E.2d 362 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997).
[26] Action Auto Stores,
Inc. v. United Capital Ins. Co., 845 F. Supp. 428, 434 (W.D. Mich. 1993)
(Phrase was found to be ambiguous and was construed in favor of insured to require
that excluded damage occur during the time work was being performed.)
[27] 845 F. Supp. 417.
[28] See, e.g., Guerin Contractors, Inc. v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 636
S.W.2d 638 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982); Alert Centre, Inc. v. Alarm Protection Servs.,
Inc., 967 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1992).
[29] See Miller v. Fidelity Phoenix Ins. Co., 231 S.E.2d 701 (S.C.
1977).
[30] See, e.g., Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d
878 (Cal. 1995); Gruol Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 524 P.2d 427
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
[31] Sentinel Ins. Co. v.
First Ins. Co. of Haw., 875 P.2d 894 (Haw. 1994); Abex Corp. v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 790 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
[32] Joe
Harden Builders Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 486 S.E.2d 89 (S.C. 1997);
United States Gypsom Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d 1226 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994).
(Author’s
Bio)
T. Eugene Allen, III is a partner in
the Columbia, South Carolina firm of Nexsen, Pruet, Jacobs & Pollard, LLC.
He practices in the areas of tort defense, insurance coverage and commercial
litigation. Mr. Allen is a member of the American and South Carolina Bar
Associations and the Defense Research Institute. He is a past President of the
South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys Association and currently serves as a
Director of the Federation of Insurance & Corporate Counsel.